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I. Introduction
In 1970, Leroy Triggs and David Crockett were discovered engag-
ing in consensual sexual activity in a public restroom in California,
and they were later convicted of "oral copulation."'1 The sole witness
against them was a police officer who observed their conduct by peer-
ing through a vent in the restroom ceiling.' The police officer acted
without a search warrant and without probable cause.3 Mr. Triggs
challenged the police surveillance as an unconstitutional search under
the Fourth Amendment 4
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1995; B.A., University
of Redlands, 1991. The author would like to thank Kate Dyer and the members of the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their help in editing this Note. The author
would also like to thank his mother, Judith O'Callaghan, for her love and support, and his
boyfriend, Marc Rubinstein, for his love and encouragement in the writing of this Note.
1. People v. Triggs, 506 P.2d 232, 233-34 (Cal. 1973).
2. Id. at 234.
3. Id. at 239.
4. Id. at 234.
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In a similar case, Timothy Gilbert is currently challenging police
surveillance of him while he was in a public restroom.5 Mr. Gilbert
was "experienc[ing] intestinal discomfort," and he entered a stall in a
public restroom.6 While using the toilet, he was observed by a police
officer who was hidden in the ceiling above the restroom.7 Mr. Gil-
bert was arrested and detained, even though there was no evidence
that he had engaged in illegal activities.8
The issue in both cases is whether police surveillance of a public
restroom9 is an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects people from
"unreasonable searches and seizures"' by federal and state govern-
ments.1 The government must have probable cause'2 before con-
ducting a search, or the search is considered unreasonable and thus
unconstitutional. 3 Usually the police are required to obtain a warrant
5. Gilbert v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 826 F. Supp. 433 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Mr. Gilbert
is suing police and store employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of numerous
rights, including the Fourth Amendment as incorporated under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In the opinion cited, the court rejected defendants' motion to dismiss.
6. Id at 434.
7. Id. at 434-35.
8. Id at 435. Despite repeated requests, the police refused to inform Mr. Gilbert of
the crime he was being charged with. Id. A newspaper article indicated that Mr. Gilbert
was charged with "exposure of sex organs" and this charge was later dismissed for insuffi-
cient evidence. Bruce Vielmetti, Restroom Surveillance Challenged, ST. PnTERSBURG
TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1993, at lB. As a result of the arrest and an incorrect police report, Mr.
Gilbert was temporarily suspended from his job as an assistant principal, and later returned
to work in a "district office instead of in a school as a principal." Id
9. For the purposes of this Note, a public restroom is a restroom open to the public.
In Triggs, the restroom was located in Arroyo Seco Park in Los Angeles. 506 P.2d at 234.
In Gilbert, the restroom was located in a Sears department store in a Tampa mall. 826 F.
Supp. at 434.
10. Amendment IV of the U.S. Constitution reads in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CON ST. amend. IV.
11. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), the Court held that the Bill of Rights
restricts federal but not state action. Later, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court incorporated provisions from the Bill of Rights into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and held them applicable to the States. In Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment, making it applicable to the States. However, the Court did not
incorporate the exclusionary rule. Id at 33. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the
Court specifically incorporated the exclusionary rule.
12. The test for probable cause is whether there is sufficient evidence for a person of
reasonable caution to believe that seizable evidence will be found in the place to be
searched. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
13. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
before conducting a search or seizure,' 4 but in some circumstances the
police may act on probable cause without a warrant.' 5 In other cir-
cumstances, the government may conduct investigations which are not
considered 'searches' and thus do not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment.'6 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Katz v. United States,
propounded what is now the modem test for determining whether
governmental investigatory practices are considered Fourth Amend-
ment searches: does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the place searched. 17
Since Katz, courts have been confronted with a number of cases
involving Fourth Amendment challenges to surreptitious surveil-
lance' 8 by police of public restrooms. 19 In many of these cases, men
were arrested for masturbating or engaging in consensual sex with
other men.20 In the process of researching this Note, no published
cases were located in which women were charged with masturbating
or having sex with other women in a public restroom.2' Records are
14. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967).
15. For an explanation of when police may act on probable cause alone, without a
warrant, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 62-65
(1991).
16. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (unreasonable to expect privacy in bank
deposit slips and checks); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (unreasonable to expect
privacy in pen registers (list of telephone calls made to and from a telephone)); United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (unreasonable to expect privacy from dog sniff in a
public place); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (unreasonable to expect privacy
from view in open field); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (unreasonable to expect
privacy in jail cell); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (unreasonable to expect privacy
in vehicle identification number); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (unreasonable
to expect privacy in curtilage, the area surrounding a person's home, when the area is
visible from aircraft traveling in legal airspace); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988) (unreasonable to expect privacy in garbage placed at curb); Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445 (1989) (unreasonable to expect privacy in curtilage when the area is visible from
helicopter traveling in legal airspace).
17. 389 U.S. 346,361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See infra Section II for a full discussion
of the Katz test.
18. In State v. Owczarzak, 766 P.2d 399, 400 (Or. Ct. App. 1988), the police used a
hidden video camera to peer into a public restroom. In Triggs, 506 P.2d at 234, the police
peered into a public restroom through a vent in the ceiling. Both cases serve to illustrate
the type of surveillance this Note is addressing with the term "surreptitious surveillance."
19. See infra notes and text accompanying Sections III and IV; see also Michael R.
Flaherty, Annotation, Search and Seizure" Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Public
Restroom, 74 A.L.R. 4th 508 (1994).
20. The majority of the other cases arising out of police surveillance of public
restrooms are drug related. See generally United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617 (10th Cir.
1988); State v. Jupiter, 501 So. 2d 248 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Moore v. State, 355 So. 2d 1219
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); United States v. Smith, 293 A.2d 856 (D.C. 1972).
21. This is not to say that lesbians have not been prosecuted for having sex in quasi-
private areas. For instance, in People v. Livermore, 155 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967),
two women were charged with gross indecency for engaging in consensual sex in a tent at a
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not kept on the actual number of people subjected to surreptitious
surveillance. The number of people prosecuted based on surreptitious
surveillance of public restrooms is not readily available.22 Anecdotal
evidence from published cases and newspaper articles indicates that a
number of men have been prosecuted for sexual conduct in public
restrooms based on evidence obtained through surreptitious surveil-
lance.23 Given the Katz test, the question presented in these cases is
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
public restroom. In addressing this issue, courts have considered a
number of factors and have reached divergent conclusions.
In addition, several commentators have addressed the issue of
whether it is reasonable to expect privacy in a public restroom.24
public camping ground. One case was found in which a woman was charged for having sex
with a man in a men's restroom. People v. Hunt, 259 N.W.2d 147 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977). In
Hunt, a police officer's entrance into the restroom was challenged on Fourth Amendment
grounds. Id. at 148. The door to the restroom was not locked; the pair had occupied the
men's restroom for thirty minutes and could be heard "moaning." I& Based on these
facts, the appeals court held that the defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Il at 149.
The analysis for women's restrooms would be similar to that of men's restrooms, with
the exception that women's restrooms do not include urinals in the common area. See
discussion of the common area, infra Sections IIIA and IVA.
22. People prosecuted based on evidence obtained through surreptitious surveillance
may choose not to challenge the surveillance for a number of reasons, including anti-gay
bigotry and the stigma associated with charges of public sex. For example, in four of the
five cases cited in note 23, infra, only a fraction of the people arrested were involved in the
suits challenging the surveillance. For a discussion of anti-gay bigotry and the stigma asso-
ciated with sex in public restrooms, see generally Tim Retzloff, Policing, Politics, and Para-
digms: The University of Michigan Restroom Sex Scandals, 3 STEAM 48 (1995).
23. Young v. State, 849 P.2d 336, 339 (Nev. 1993) (approximately twenty people ob-
served engaged in sexual acts); People v. Austin, 460 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (twenty-eight people arrested); State v. Holt, 630 P.2d 854, 856 (Or. 1981) ("The
police had been conducting surreptitious surveillance of the men's restroom for approxi-
mately two years prior to defendant's arrest but no application for a search warrant was
ever made. The officer in the case had made over 130 arrests at this restroom in less than
three months of surveillance."); People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) (forty people arrested); Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
(twenty people arrested). The same surveillance efforts in Gilbert, supra notes 5-8, also
resulted in the arrest of "[h]undreds of men .... but charges against many were dis-
missed." Vielmetti, supra note 8, at lB. Similar surveillance also resulted in the resigna-
tion of a Republican Congressman in the early eighties. Paul N. Valentine, Former Rep.
Hinson Pleads 'No Contest' To Morals Charge, WASH. POsT, May 29, 1981, at A18.
24. George F. Butterworth, Note, People v. Triggs: A New Concept of Personal Privacy
in Search and Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 575 (1974) (discussing the effect of the con-
demnation by the court in People v. Triggs of clandestine surveillance upon search and
seizure law); Jeanette R. Scharrer, Comment, Covert Electronic Surveillance of Public Rest
Rooms: Privacy in the Common Area?, 6 COOLEY L. Rnv. 495 (1989) (discussing the then
current analysis of Michigan courts considering the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy in the common area of a public restroom); Kristin V. Richardson, Comment,
Searches, Privacy, and the Notion of Constitutional Protection in a Public Restroom, 25
However, the analyses have largely focused on whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy under the case law of a single state.
In addition, an attempt to justify a reasonable expectation of privacy
in all areas of a public restroom has not been previously undertaken.
This Note will address all of the arguments regarding the reasonable-
ness of an expectation of privacy in a public restroom, and it will sup-
port the conclusion that it is reasonable to expect privacy in all areas
of a public restroom.
Section I of this Note is the Introduction. Section II will explain
the Katz test. Section III will set forth the arguments that support the
finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public restroom.
Section IV will analyze the arguments that courts have used to sup-
port a finding that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in a public rest-
room. Finally, Section V will conclude that it is reasonable to expect
privacy in all areas of a public restroom.
H. The Katz Test
The modern test for determining whether police activity is a
search within the scope of the Fourth Amendment was established in
Katz v. United States.S In that case, the FBI attached an "electronic
listening and recording device" to the outside panel of a public tele-
phone booth and used the device to listen to and record the defend-
ant's conversation.26 The defendant challenged this eavesdropping
and the court was asked to determine whether the FBI's conduct was
a search under the Fourth Amendment.27 The parties to the suit fo-
cused on whether the area where the defendant was located, a public
phone booth, was a constitutionally protected area.28 In his opinion
for the majority, Justice Stewart rejected this approach:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his [or her] own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he [or she] seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. 2 9
The Court found it reasonable for a person to expect to be free from
WiLLAMmT-E L. REv. 855 (1989) (discussing the reasonableness of an expectation of pri-
vacy in a public restroom, focusing primarily on Oregon state court opinions and conclud-
ing that Owczarzak was poorly decided).
25. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26. 1d. at 348.
27. Id& at 348-49.
28. Id. at 351.
29. Itt at 351-52.
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the "uninvited ear" in a public telephone booth.30 The Court held
that the government's electronic surveillance "violated the privacy
upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using the tele-
phone booth" and was thus a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.31
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the protec-
tion afforded people under the Fourth Amendment "requires refer-
ence to a 'place.' ' 32 Justice Harlan established a two-part test for
determining whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated. First, "a
person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and, second, that [ ] expectation [must] be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' 33
Applying this test to the facts in Katz, Justice Harlan recognized a
limited expectation of privacy in a public telephone booth: "The point
is not that the booth is 'accessible to the public' at other times.., but
that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' ex-
pectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable.134
Justice Harlan's test was later adopted by the majority of the Court in
New York v. Class.35
The subjective prong from Katz has been heavily criticized.36
30. Id at 352 ("One who occupies [a public telephone booth], shuts the door behind
him [or her], and pays the toll that permits him [or her] to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he [or she] utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.").
31. Id. at 353. The Court also rejected the old "property threshold" test, in which the
Fourth Amendment search and seizure provision was not implicated unless there was a
trespass. Id at 352-53.
32. Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. 1d
34. Id
35. 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
36. The argument is that the subjective prong would allow a loop-hole through which
the police could avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. As one commentator
explained:
[I]f the subjective component is taken seriously, the government can eliminate
privacy expectations by the simple act of announcing its intention to conduct
Orwellian surveillance. Once people know that the government is reading their
mail, listening to their conversations, and generally intruding on their privacy,
they will have no subjective expectation of privacy.
DRESSLER, supra note 15, at §30[D]. The Court has also noted this problem:
[I]f the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all
homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter
might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their
homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country,
unaware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that the police were
continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,740 n.5 (1979). The Court acknowledged that in such
circumstances, the subjective test would be counterproductive, and the objective test alone
However, the subjective prong has not been formally rejected by a
majority of the Court. An analysis of the subjective prong will vary
case by case and is beyond the scope of this Note.37
I. Arguments Supporting a Person's Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in a Public Restroom
Courts have been confronted with a number of cases in which a
party challenged police surveillance of a public restroom on Fourth
Amendment grounds. In order to evaluate whether the Fourth
Amendment applies, a court must determine whether the surveillance
was a "search" under the Katz expectation of privacy test. Many of
the court opinions on this issue turn on the particular facts of the case
under consideration. However, the courts have focused on two issues:
the location of the activity observed and the design of the particular
restroom in question. Courts have divided public restrooms into three
distinct areas when analyzing privacy expectations: the common area,
toilet stalls without doors, and toilet stalls with doors.38 In each of
these areas, courts have differed regarding the reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy. Courts generally order these three
locations hierarchically, with the broadest expectation of privacy in a
closed stall, a lesser expectation of privacy in an open or doorless stall,
and the narrowest expectation of privacy in the common area.39 As a
result, many of the arguments which support finding a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in a less private area also apply with greater force
to more private areas. This section will outline the arguments adopted
by courts which have found a reasonable expectation of privacy in a
public restroom.
would carry the day. Id. at 741 n.5. Justice Harlan himself later disavowed the subjective
prong that he enumerated, acknowledging that the objective prong alone was sufficient for
determining whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated. United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. This Note takes the position that the general public expects privacy in public
restrooms. See infra Section IIl and accompanying footnotes. This expectation is not di-
minished when the police conduct surreptitious surveillance because a person has no rea-
son to know that he or she is being watched. In addition, the defendants in some of the
cases cited in this Note consciously sought to keep their activity private, demonstrating a
subjective expectation of privacy. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. Finally,
this Note will take the position that surreptitious surveillance of public restrooms, even if
announced, is Orwellian and should be protected by the Fourth Amendment through ap-
plication of the objective prong alone.
38. See Flaherty, supra note 19.
39. See infra Sections IIIA-HIC and IVA-IVC.
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A. The Common Area
The common area of a public restroom is the area not enclosed
by stalls. This area may include sinks for washing hands and urinals
(in men's restrooms). It is reasonable to expect privacy from surrepti-
tious surveillance in the common area of a public restroom even
though it is open to all same-sex members of the public.
Initially, and most importantly, public restrooms are designed to
accommodate activities which our society considers personal. Public
restrooms are only open to persons of the same gender for this very
reason. For example, in men's restrooms, urinals are often located in
the common area. A man must uncover his penis to use a urinal.40 In
our society, both the exposure of genitals and urination are considered
private activities. "'The final bastion of privacy is to be found in the
area of human procreation and excretion' and '[if] a person is entitled
to any shred of privacy, then it is privacy as to these matters."' 4' It is
reasonable to expect privacy from surreptitious viewing or videotap-
ing in an area designed to accommodate such personal activities.
Other men may be present in a men's restroom, and a user of a urinal
will necessarily have a diminished expectation of privacy when others
are present. While it is reasonable that a person accept the risk of
infringement upon his or her privacy from another person of whose
presence he or she is aware, it does not logically follow that a public
restroom user should accept the continual and unknown privacy inva-
sion of surreptitious surveillance.
In addition, the common area of a public restroom may be used
to conduct many other private activities. The common area may regu-
larly be used to:
[C]hange clothes, nurse infants, adjust undergarments, apply
make-up and, putting it somewhat politely, relieve itches in pri-
vate parts. Commonly, people also carry on private conversa-
tions in public restrooms. Members of our free society hardly
expect to be monitored while performing these perfectly appro-
priate and normal activities. That expectation is undiminished
by the knowledge that the facility is accessible to others.42
It is the expectation of privacy, albeit a limited one, which people rely
upon in conducting these private activities.
40. Some men choose to use a toilet in a stall to ensure a greater degree of privacy.
41. State v. Casconi, 766 P.2d 397, 399 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (alteration in original)
(quoting Sterling v. Cupp, 607 P.d 206,208 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd as modified, 625 P.2d
123 (Or. 1981)).
42. People v. Austin, No. 86-57441, slip op. at 9-10 (Ingham Cir. Ct. July 11, 1989)
(quoted in Scharrer, 6 Cooley L. Rev. 495, n. 162 (1989)).
This reasoning was affirmed by the court in State v. Owczarzak.4 3
In Owczarzak, the police, conducting surveillance of a public rest-
room with a hidden camera, observed Mr. Owczarzak masturbating in
front of a doorless stal.44 The state argued that Mr. Owczarzak had
no reasonable expectation of privacy because he was masturbating in
the common area, in the view of another patron.45 The court rejected
this argument, finding that Mr. Owczarzak had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy to be free from surreptitious surveillance.46 The court
explained that a person in the common area of a public restroom "an-
ticipates that another person might enter and see what is going on.
What a person does not anticipate is that his [or her] activity will be
seen by concealed officers or recorded by concealed cameras." 47
The reasonableness of an expectation of privacy from surrepti-
tious surveillance in a restroom is illustrated by the response of police
officers who were subjected to it themselves. For example, in Dade
County, Florida, surreptitious surveillance of a restroom in a police
station was conducted in an attempt to catch a thief.48 A hidden cam-
era was operated "for less than an hour over a ten day period. '49
"The only thing that was visible [from the camera] was the sink."5"
Nevertheless, the police officers claimed that this surveillance violated
their right to privacy and threatened to sue.51 According to Hugh
Peebles, president of the Dade County Police Benevolent Association,
the argument that the restroom is not a place where a person can rea-
sonably expect privacy is "outrageous."52 He asked: "If you can't ex-
pect privacy in the men's room, where can you expect it?"5 3
43. 766 P.2d 399 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). This case was decided solely on state constitu-
tional grounds. The court did not consider the Fourth Amendment issue because the sur-
veillance was rejected as an illegal search under the Oregon Constitution. Id. at 401 n.1.
44. Id. at 400.
45. Id. at 401.
46. lit; see also People v. Triggs, 506 P.2d 232, 236 (Cal. 1973) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy from surreptitious surveillance in a public restroom and that the
expectation "is not diminished or destroyed because the toilet being used lacks a door.").
See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
47. Owczarzak, 766 P.2d at 401.
48. Edna Buchanan, Police Put Camera Spy In Men's Room, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 3,
1983, at lB.
49. Id (quoting Lt. Robert Norris of the police station). The surveillance time was
minimal because the police were only conducting surveillance during the time that items
were left out as bait for the thief. Id Sgt. Fred Pelny, the officer in charge of monitoring
the surveillance screen, estimated the time at "closer to 15 minutes because the planted
items were always returned so fast." Id.
50. Id (quoting District Commander Douglas Hughes); see also infra note 51.
51. Id. Sgt. Peiny responded that the surveillance "in no way invaded anybody's pri-
vacy unless they were urinating in the sink."
52. Id
53. Id
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In a similar situation in Concord, California, a surveillance cam-
era was installed in a police restroom in an attempt to catch vandals
who had flooded the restroom by stuffing the urinals with toilet pa-
per.54 Three years later, police officers discovered that the restroom
had been subjected to surreptitious surveillance.55 Thirty-nine indi-
viduals joined in a lawsuit against the city and the police chief, claim-
ing the surveillance violated their right to privacy and seeking one
million dollars in damages each.56
Further, public restrooms are designed to ensure privacy from the
view of the general public. "A restroom is a place that, by its very
nature, excludes unlimited observation."57 Public restrooms are en-
closures, either with no windows or with windows which are inaccessi-
ble to the public view. As such, a person is generally shielded from
the view of all people except those who are actually present in the
restroom.5
8
Thus, it is reasonable to expect privacy in a public restroom based
on the combination of two factors: (1) the private nature of activities
which public restrooms are designed to accommodate, and (2) the de-
sign features of public restrooms which limit public observation. If a
urinal were located in the middle of a town square, it would be unrea-
sonable to expect privacy from view because nothing would block the
general public's view. However, men may choose not to use such a
urinal for this very reason. Similarly, in areas with restricted public
view, such as a booth in a restaurant or a secluded area of a forest,
society may be unwilling to recognize a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy because the other indicia of privacy are absent. It is the combi-
nation of these two factors which makes it reasonable to expect
privacy from surreptitious surveillance in public restrooms.
B. Doorless Stalls
It is reasonable to expect privacy in a doorless stall located in a
public restroom even though the inside of the stall may be visible from
some vantage points in the restroom. Doorless stalls are located
within a public restroom, isolated from the public view. Within a pub-
54. Dean Congbalay, Turmoil Divides Concord Police Dept., S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15,




57. Owczarzak, 766 P.2d at 401.
58. In People v. Anonymous, 415 N.Y.S.2d 921, 923 (Justice's Ct. 1979), the court
makes the following finding: "The reasonable expectation of privacy generated by the en-
closed nature of the whole bathroom facility was only to exclude the using public male
users from the gaze of the non-using public." Nevertheless, the court found it unreasona-
ble to expect privacy from surreptitious surveillance. Id. at 922-23.
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lic restroom, a person expects privacy from all people except those in
the restroom.5 9 Stalls are designed to provide a greater degree of pri-
vacy than the common area: stalls are generally set off from the com-
mon area and contain partitions which limit the view of other people
in the restroom. In addition, a stall is designed for single occupancy.
One court relied on the expectation of exclusive use as a factor sup-
porting the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy.60 Finally, the
toilet is the central feature of a stall, and its use is considered a very
personal activity in our society.61
In State v. Casconi,62 the State prosecuted Mr. Casconi for public
indecency. 63 The State's evidence was based on the observations of a
police officer who used a concealed camera to discover Mr. Casconi
masturbating inside a doorless toilet stall. 64 The state argued that, as
Mr. Casconi could have been seen by a restroom patron, he had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the doorless toilet stall.65 The
court rejected the government's argument: "[t]hat information may be
legally obtained does not mean that every method that can be used to
obtain the same information does not invade an individual's privacy
interest or constitute a search. '66 The court concluded that Mr. Cas-
coni did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the doorless stall
which was violated by the surreptitious surveillance. 67
Similarly, in People v. Triggs,68 the police arrested Mr. Triggs for
having sex with another man in a public restroom based on evidence
obtained through the use of surreptitious surveillance.69 In Triggs, the
court held that public restroom patrons have a reasonable expectation
of privacy from surreptitious surveillance.70 The court concluded that
this expectation of privacy is not defeated by the fact that the patrons
entered a doorless stall.7 1 The court warned of the privacy implica-
59. See supra Section IIIA.
60. See discussion of Commonwealth v. Bloom, infra notes 102-103.
61. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
62. 766 P.2d 397 (Or. Ct. App. 1988). This case was decided solely on state constitu-
tional grounds. The court did not consider the Fourth Amendment issue since the surveil-
lance was rejected as an illegal search under the Oregon Constitution. Id- at 399.
63. let at 397.
64. IL at 398.
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Itd at 399.
68. 506 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1973).
69. Id at 233-34.
70. Id. at 236.
71. let at 237 ("The clandestine observations of rest rooms does not fall from the pur-
view of the Fourth Amendment merely through the removal of toilet stall doors."). See
also Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("Since we find that the
expectation of privacy is generated by the nature of the activity involved, rather than by
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tions of a finding that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in a public
restroom:
[Holding that clandestine observation of doorless stalls in public
restrooms is not a search] would permit the police to make it a
routine practice to observe from hidden vantage points the rest-
room conduct of the public whenever such activities do not oc-
cur within fully enclosed toilet stalls and would permit spying on
the "innocent and the guilty alike." Most persons using public
restrooms have no reason to suspect that a hidden agent of the
state will observe them. The expectation of privacy a person has
when he [or she] enters a restroom is reasonable and is not di-
minished or destroyed because the toilet stall being used lacks a
door.72
The court in Triggs also noted that the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty of crimi-
nal activity.7' For example, unconstitutional surveillance of public
restrooms also infringes upon the rights of the individuals who are not
arrested, because they are still subjected to unconstitutional surveil-
lance of their most private activities. 74 Thus, it should be reasonable
for a person in a public restroom stall to expect privacy from view by
all people except those patrons who are within the viewing range of
the stall.
C. Closed-Door Stalls
It is reasonable for a person in a closed stall of a public restroom
to expect privacy from public view. A stall is an enclosed area within
a public restroom, and thus the outside of a stall is only visible to
people present in a restroom. In addition, a closed stall, which sur-
rounds its user, isolates the user from view by other patrons of the
restroom. Stalls are designed to afford the user privacy from view so
that the user may comfortably engage in the personal activity of using
a toilet.
In Kroehler v. Scott,75 the plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibit-
ing the police from conducting surreptitious surveillance of public
restroom stalls.76 The court found that people in public toilet stalls
"harbor[ ] reasonable expectations of privacy which are generally rec-
ognized as subjectively and objectively reasonable, and are thus enti-
the precise physical characteristics of the stall, whether or not the stalls had doors is not a
crucially material inquiry.").
72. Triggs, 506 P.2d at 236.
73. Id at 237.
74. Id. at 238.
75. 391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
76. I at 1115.
tied to Fourth Amendment protections. '77 The court held that "[t]he
warrantless and non-selective search of all individuals who happen to
be in the area cannot be justified under the circumstances here in-
volved. '78 As the court explained:
[We are compelled to safeguard zealously the fundamental
guarantees embodied in the Constitution, particularly as they
pertain to innocent and law-abiding citizens properly using pub-
lic facilities. Therefore, we cannot ignore the fact that these sur-
veillances swept into the gaze of the government not only those
involved in criminal activity, but also countless innocent and un-
knowing persons who reasonably expected and were properly
entitled to a modicum of privacy. Such a practice cannot be
condoned on the sole ground that the [police] understandably
expected to find evidence of criminal activity on the part of cer-
tain individuals while simultaneously subjecting all individuals
using the facilities to a general "search. '79
Similarly, in State v. Limberhand,80 a police officer entered a stall
in a public restroom adjacent to the stall occupied by Mr. Limberhand
and looked through a hole in the partition between the two stalls at
Mr. Limberhand's "crotch area." 81 The officer observed Mr. Limber-
hand masturbating.Y2 The officer invited Mr. Limberhand to accom-
pany him to a nearby motel, but Mr. Limberhand rejected the
proposition. 3 The officer later arrested Mr. Limberhand for obscene
live conduct. 84 However, the court concluded that Mr. Limberhand
had a reasonable expectation of privacy while in the closed stall:
The activities associated with the use of a toilet are private,
based on widely accepted social norms. We acknowledge that
the privacy interest in a public telephone booth is auditory while
the privacy interest generated within a bathroom stall is to be
free from visual intrusion. Otherwise we find no constitutional
distinction between a public telephone booth and a public rest-
room stall with regard to the privacy expectation generated
within.85
The court noted that the fact that a hole was cut out of the partition
did not defeat Mr. Limberhand's reasonable expectation of privacy.8 6
77. Id at 1117.
78. Id at 1119.
79. Id
80. 788 P.2d 857 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).




85. Id at 861.
86. Id
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IV. Analysis of Arguments Against a Person's Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy in a Public Restroom
This section will present the arguments which courts have found
persuasive when concluding that it is unreasonable to expect privacy
in the three areas of a public restroom. This section will also analyze
these arguments as they are presented.
A. The Common Area
Many courts have held that clandestine police surveillance of the
common area is not a search because people do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in this area.87 The primary argument support-
ing this theory is that it is unreasonable to expect privacy in the com-
mon area because it is open to all same-gender members of the
public, 88 and, even if the area is empty, "strangers may enter at any
moment." 89
Courts which have considered instances in which there was no
risk of a stranger's sudden intrusion have nevertheless rejected an ex-
pectation of privacy in the common area. For instance, in Common-
wealth v. Bloom9" the design of the restroom afforded Mr. Bloom
three seconds warning time before anyone entering the restroom
would reach the common area.91 The court rejected the argument
that this warning time established a reasonable expectation of privacy,
concluding that "[n]o logical reason precluded the police from viewing
covertly what they had a right to view openly. The defendant's expec-
tation of advance warning is not of constitutionally protected
dimensions."'
Similarly, in State v. Jarrell,93 two men were observed through a
hole in the ceiling of a public restroom by an officer hidden in the
attic, and were convicted of "the crime against nature.194 In Jarrell,
one man stood and looked out of the restroom window while another
man performed oral sex on him.95 The court held that the men "did
87. See infra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., State v. Holt, 630 P.2d 854, 858 (Or. 1981).
89. IL; People v. Anonymous, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Justice's Ct. 1979) ("At any in-
stant it is plain that a member of the public could have walked into the restroom and, have
seen, ii plain sight the commission of this sexual act. This fact alone destroys utterly the
defendants' contention that the trooper's [surveillance] violated their 'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy."').
90. 468 N.E.2d 667 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
91. Id. at 668 (the entrance was separated from the common area by a ten to twelve
foot wide partition).
92. Id.
93. 211 S.E.2d 837 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975), cert denied, 213 S.E.2d 724 (N.C. 1975).
94. Id. at 838.
95. Id.
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not acquire the right to insulate their activities with Fourth Amend-
ment protection merely by attempting to maintain a lookout for per-
sons who might enter the restroom. ' 96 The Jarrell court also rejected
the defendants' claim that they had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy from clandestine surveillance, concluding that there was "no con-
stitutional right in defendants to demand that such observation be
made only by some person of whose presence they were aware."'97
However, courts have found that simply because a police officer
may have been able to obtain information without conducting a
Fourth Amendment search does not shield other methods of obtaining
that information from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 98
In Katz, for example, the fact that the police may have been able to
use a method not violative of the Fourth Amendment to obtain the
same information would not have defeated Katz's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy from the method actually used by the police.99
The fact that another person may enter the common area does
not defeat the expectation of privacy absent actual entry. The argu-
ment is not that it is reasonable to expect absolute privacy in the com-
mon area, but rather, that it is reasonable to expect privacy from
surreptitious surveillance in the common area. In Katz, the court rec-
ognized a limited expectation of privacy: the defendant could not ex-
pect privacy from public eyes, but could expect privacy from public
ears. 100 A public restroom shields an occupant from public eyes just
as the telephone booth in Katz shielded an occupant from public ears.
Unlike the phone booth in Katz, however, the common area of a rest-
room is designed for use by more than one person at a time. There-
fore, it is not reasonable to expect exclusive occupancy or to expect
privacy from view by other people present in the common area. How-
ever, it is reasonable to expect privacy absent actual entry. Surrepti-
tious surveillance is a form of monitoring the restroom without
normal entry, and it is reasonable to expect privacy from this type of
government entry into the common area of a public restroom.
A parallel can be drawn to Katz by imagining two adjoining tele-
phone booths with the glass broken out between the two booths
("phone booth A" and "phone booth B"). A person using phone
booth A should not reasonably expect aural privacy from a person
using phone booth B. However, if phone booth B is unoccupied,
should users of phone booth A have reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy from the public ear? It is reasonable for the user of phone booth
96. Id at 840.
97. Id
98. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
99. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Section II and accompanying footnotes.
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A to expect privacy as long as phone booth B is unoccupied. The
potential that phone booth B will be occupied should not defeat an
expectation of privacy when phone booth B is not actually occupied.
Similarly, it is reasonable to expect freedom from public view, and
thus surreptitious surveillance, as long as a public restroom remains
empty. The privacy a person reasonably expects in a public restroom
may be limited by the entrance of other members of the public, but
the possibility of such an entrance should not result in a finding of no
reasonable expectation of privacy at all.
Joshua Dressler provides a permutation of Katz which also ilus-
trates the reasonableness of a limited expectation of privacy:
Suppose that X, a lip reader hired by the government, had stood
outside the booth and "listened" to D's conversation? If D had
observed X watching his lips, would he have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding this mode of interception of his
conversation? Perhaps not, at least if D had understood that X
was reading his lips. Under such circumstances, D "knowingly
exposed" (to use Justice Stewart's language) his words to X; his
conversations were "in the open" (to use Justice Harlan's
words) insofar as X was concerned. As well, Stewart explicitly
distinguished between "intruding eyes" and "uninvited ears."
One could reason, therefore, that Katz stands for the proposi-
tion that a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding one mode of intrusion, and yet have none if the same
information is intercepted in another manner. 101
In the example, the government may use a lip reader to "hear" the
conversation, and this would not be considered a search. However, D
still maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy from the public ear.
The fact that the government could have obtained the same informa-
tion without conducting a Fourth Amendment search does not allow
the government to claim that other methods of obtaining the informa-
tion are not a search. The same is true in the public restroom context.
It may be unreasonable to expect privacy in a public restroom from an
"intruding" eye (actual entry) and reasonable to expect privacy from
an "uninvited" eye (surreptitious surveillance). The fact that the gov-
ernment could obtain the information without conducting a search, by
actually entering the restroom, does not mean that another method,
surreptitious surveillance, is not a search.
Some courts have relied on additional factors in holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public restroom.
The court in Bloom held that a right to exclusive use of an area is a
prerequisite to a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.10 2
The court noted that since Mr. Bloom did not have a right to exclusive
101. DRESSLER, supra note 15, at §30[C] n.24.
102. Commonwealth v. Bloom, 468 N.E.2d 667, 668 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
use of the common area, he did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the common area. °3
The Supreme Court has not recognized an "exclusive use" re-
quirement, and such a limited interpretation of Katz is not warranted.
The Supreme Court has focused on whether a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy."° An expectation of exclusive use may add to
a person's claim that he or she has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but should not serve as a threshold requirement. For example,
in the adjoining telephone booth example, it is reasonable to expect
privacy if the other telephone booth is empty, even though there is no
reasonable expectation of exclusive use. In addition, use of the com-
mon area of a public restroom regularly involves activities which are
substantially more private in nature than the use of a public phone,
and this fact presents a stronger argument against the exclusive use
requirement in the public restroom context. 0 5 Otherwise, an exclu-
sive use requirement would routinely allow the police to videotape
activity in the common area, including the use of urinals.
In State v. Holt,'°6 an officer looked into a public restroom
through a vent between the restroom and a storage room. 0 7 Based
on his observations, 08 the officer entered the restroom, saw Mr. Holt
masturbating,10 9 and arrested him for public indecency. 1 0 The court
held that Mr. Holt did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
and thus the police surveillance was not a search."' The court but-
tressed its holding with the argument that if the court were to rule that
Mr. Holt did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public
restroom, this would "severely restrict police stake-outs, surveillances
and undercover investigation."' 2
The Fourth Amendment requires a limitation on what the police
may lawfully do when fighting crime. Here, however, the court
looked at the result of applying the Fourth Amendment and con-
103. AL
104. See supra Section II.
105. See supra Section IIA.
106. 630 P.2d 854 (Or. 1981).
107. Id at 856.
108. The court explained that "the officer saw the defendant enter the restroom, walk
to the urinal area and bend over to look under the toilet stall partitions. Both stalls were
occupied and defendant left the restroom. After the two restroom occupants departed,
defendant re-entered and sat on one of the toilets." ItL
109. Holt, 630 P.2d at 856. The officer saw Mr. Holt masturbating from two vantage
points: through a hole in the partition between two toilets and from the front of the door-
less stall. Mr. Holt challenged this evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree of the initial
surreptitious surveillance. Id. at 858.
110. Id at 856.
111. Id at 858.
112. Id
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cluded that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because a
contrary holding would restrict police surveillance. If courts reached
similar conclusions in other Fourth Amendment search cases, the
Fourth Amendment would soon be rendered a nullity. That enforce-
ment of the Fourth Amendment may inhibit law enforcement is not a
principled constitutional reason for finding that it is unreasonable to
expect privacy in a particular area.
In People v. Anonymous,"13 the police observed two men engage
in consensual sodomy in the common area of a public restroom. 114
The court concluded that the police surveillance was not a search be-
cause the men had no reasonable expectation of privacy." 5 The court
explained that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in the
common area is limited to excretionary and ablutional acts, and never
includes sexual activity.116
This argument is simply not logical. The court could render the
Fourth Amendment meaningless with this argument if it is consist-
ently applied in analogous situations. In essence, the court is saying
that a person only has a reasonable expectation of privacy for legal
activities, but not for illegal activities. If the Supreme Court had ap-
plied the same argument in Katz, it would have been forced to find no
reasonable expectation of privacy because Katz's conversation in-
volved the illegal transmission of betting information through the
phone lines. Thus, the Anonymous court's reasoning on this point is
unprincipled.
In addition, the Anonymous court noted that the common area
does not have all of the indicia of privacy: doors, locks, or boundaries
of distance." 7 These requirements are not dictated by Katz. In fact,
in Katz there is no evidence of locks or boundaries of distance,. and
yet the Court found it reasonable to expect privacy in the public tele-
phone booth. In addition, the common area of a public restroom is
physically separated from view of other public areas. The common
area often has a door between it and other public areas.
Finally, the Anonymous court expressed concern that the general
public or "infants of tender years" might be exposed to public gay sex
if the police are not allowed to conduct warrantless surveillance of
113. 415 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Just Ct., Town of Greenburgh, Westchester Cty. 1979).
114. 1& at 922-23.
115. Id. at 923.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 923-24. The Anonymous court listed a number of justifications for its finding
that the defendants did not reasonably expect privacy in the restroom. The court, however,
did not explain whether each point independently supports a finding of no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy or some combination of the arguments is necessary to support such a
finding.
public restrooms. 118 Again, the court demonstrated a general distaste
for gay sex rather than elucidating a neutral constitutional principle.
People, including children, are exposed to criminal activity in private
and public areas. The court might be able to decrease this exposure
across the board by eliminating the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements altogether, but the Fourth Amendment requires other-
wise. In addition, the Anonymous court did not address other policy
issues, such as the relationship between societal bigotry directed at
gays and lesbians and the fact that some gay men engage in anony-
mous sex, in areas such as at public restrooms, in order to hide their
sexual orientation. 1 9 Also, in a case of heterosexuals having sex in
public, one court was not concerned about the fact that the general
public, including children, might be exposed to public straight sex.' 20
Finally, the Anonymous court seems unconcerned that failure to rec-
ognize an expectation of privacy in public restrooms means that the
general public, including children, may be exposed to police cameras
and video tape recorders while they are engaging in the various activi-
ties conducted in a public restroom.
Even if the courts do find it reasonable to expect privacy from
surreptitious surveillance of the common area of a public restroom,
the police may still conduct surveillance pursuant to a search warrant
based on probable cause. The police may also enter restrooms to look
for illegal activity.'12  What the police happen to see in plain view is
not a search under the Fourth Amendment.'22 Physical entry into the
restroom by strangers, including police officers, necessarily diminishes
the occupant's privacy expectation, as would the entrance of a police
officer into the adjoining booth in the adjacent telephone booth exam-
ple. Thus, the issue is not whether a person's "activity could have
legitimately been seen by another in the restroom but, rather, whether
the surreptitious surveillance was a search that invaded his [or her]
privacy."' z The nature of a limited expectation of privacy includes
the possibility of having no expectation of privacy in one circum-
stance, such as from the gaze of co-occupants in the common area,
while maintaining an expectation of privacy in other circumstances,
118. Id. at 924.
119. Mr. Holt told the arresting officer that he went to the public restroom looking for a
companion for oral sex because it was the only place he could go to find a partner. Holt,
630 P.2d at 856. A gay man who was arrested based on police surveillance of an area in the
woods of a public park surrounding an isolated sycamore tree explained that the reason
gay men have sex in public is "because of taboos, prejudices and hostility toward open
homosexuality." Frank Bruni, Adrian Indecency Arrests Raise Issue of Sexual Bias, DEr.
FREE PREss, Aug. 10, 1990, at Al.
120. See infra notes 154 and 155.
121. Triggs, 506 P.2d at 238-39 n.7.
122. Id
123. State v. Owczarzak, 766 P.2d 399, 401 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
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such as from surreptitious surveillance of the common area. In addi-
tion, if the police had been physically present, the participants may
not have engaged in the illegal activity.124 While it is not reasonable
to expect absolute privacy in the common area of a public restroom, it
is reasonable to expect privacy from surreptitious surveillance.
B. Doorless Stalls
More courts are willing to find that it is reasonable to expect pri-
vacy in a doorless stall than in the common area.'2 However, many
courts have rejected the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in
a doorless stall. In Buchanan v. State,26 the police, located in con-
cealed positions above men's restrooms, observed Mr. Buchanan en-
gage in oral sex with men on two separate occasions, in two separate
public restrooms. 27 On one occasion Mr. Buchanan was in a stall
with the door closed; on the other occasion he was in a doorless stall
which was visible from the common area. 28 Based on the observation
of the police, Mr. Buchanan was prosecuted for two counts of oral
sodomy, convicted and sentenced to two consecutive five-year prison
terms.129 The appeals court held that Mr. Buchanan was only entitled
to the "modicum of privacy [that a stall] design affords."'130 The court
concluded that Mr. Buchanan had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the stall with the closed door, but had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the doorless stall.3 '
In Young v. State, 32 the police had allegedly been unable to catch
men engaging in masturbation and oral sex in a public restroom be-
cause the police "could be seen and heard approaching the stalls, thus
enabling the individuals to discontinue their activities and elude detec-
tion. '1 3 3 The police began a program of clandestine surveillance of
the restroom, including surveillance of doorless stalls, which were not
visible from the common area.'34 The court found that the defend-
124. For instance, in Bloom, the defendants argued that the metal partition afforded
them three seconds warning time. 468 N.E.2d at 668. Had the police approached, the
defendants would have heard the police and could have stopped having sex before the
police caught them. Similarly, in Young, the police admitted that they could not catch
people engaging in sex when they entered the restrooms. 849 P.2d at 339.
125. See supra Section IIIB.
126. 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 930 (1972).
127. 1d. at 404.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 403.
130. ld. at 404.
131. Id.
132. 849 P.2d 336 (Nev. 1993).
133. Id. at 339.
134. Id. The police conducted their surveillance pursuant to a warrant, and the defend-
ants challenged the warrant. Id. at 339. The court did not address the validity of the war-
ants, who were arrested as a result of this surveillance, did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy because they could not "exclude the
public [view] simply by retreating into a doorless stall."' 35 The Young
court explained that the defendants "could [also] be observed over or
under the partition and through holes in the partitions," and thus they
could not claim to have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
doorless stalls. 36
The fact that a doorless stall may not exclude the view of other
restroom patrons does not defeat a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy in such a stall. The Buchanan and Young courts overlooked
the possibility of a limited expectation of privacy. When a person en-
ters a stall, he or she enters an enclosure within an enclosure. As
such, a person in a doorless stall may expect privacy from all persons
except those persons actually in the restroom, within viewing range of
the stall. If the restroom is empty or there is no one within viewing
range, then it is reasonable to expect privacy from view. "Most per-
sons using public restrooms have no reason to suspect that a hidden
agent of the state will observe them.' 37 People using the stalls may
rely on this expectation of privacy when there are no patrons within
viewing range, and cover their genitals or refrain from engaging in
certain personal acts' 38 when there are patrons within viewing range.
Moreover, the stalls may be positioned in the restroom so that
they do not face the common area.139 Thus, other patrons will not
necessarily enter the viewing range of the stalls. While some people
who need to use a stall may visually check to see if a stall is available,
others may ask or look from the side to see if a stall is empty or being
used. Regardless of the location of the stall, most people generally do
not look into open stalls that are being used. Were a patron to stand
within viewing range of a stall and look in, the person occupying the
stall would know that they were being observed.
The possibility that a patron might see into a doorless stall does
not defeat the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in a door-
less stall. Otherwise, this possibility could be used by police depart-
rant because it concluded that the surveillance was not a search, and thus no warrant was
needed. Id. at 339, 342.
135. Id. at 342.
136. Id. A person in a stall with a closed door may also be observed over and under the
partition and through the holes in a partition. It appears, therefore, that the court's rea-
soning would also apply to a stall with the door closed. Arguments regarding the reasona-
bleness of an expectation of privacy in a closed stall are addressed in Section IIC supra
and Section IVC infra.
137. Triggs, 506 P.2d at 236.
138. Cleaning up after using the toilet is one example.
139. Casconi, 766 P.2d at 398 ( "The toilet interiors could not be seen from the building
entrance or from the urinals."); Young, 849 P.2d at 338 (same); Owczarzak, 766 P.2d at 400
(noting that the interior of the doorless stalls is not visible from the restroom entrance).
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ments to routinely conduct video surveillance of activity occuring in
doorless stalls, including the use of the toilet. It may not be reason-
able to expect privacy from view when another patron is within view-
ing range and it also may not be reasonable to expect that no one will
ever enter viewing range. However, it is reasonable to expect privacy
in a doorless stall if no one is physically present within viewing range.
In the case of surreptitious surveillance, another person never physi-
cally enters viewing range, and thus it is reasonable to expect privacy
from surreptitious surveillance in a doorless stall of a public restroom.
C. Closed-Door Stalls
Generally, courts have found that P eople do have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a closed stall.' 4 However, some courts have
held that even this seemingly reasonable expectation of privacy is
limited.
In State v. Jupiter,4' a police officer looked through the space
between the door and the frame of a toilet stall,142 and then climbed
upon a vanity next to the stall and looked over the partition and into
the stall.'4 3 From this vantage point, the officer saw that Mr. Jupiter
had cocaine, and arrested Mr. Jupiter based on this evidence. 144 Ad-
dressing the Fourth Amendment challenge, the court held that Mr.
Jupiter did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from public
observation through the one-inch space or from above the partition. 45
Privacy expectations should not be dependent on such design
'limitations.' Otherwise, it would be unreasonable to expect privacy in
a closed-stall because all stalls contain some openings. In both
Limberhand and Kroehler the stall design was limited, yet the courts
found it reasonable to expect privacy in both cases.'46 This is because
140. See supra Section IIIC.
141. 501 So. 2d 248 (La. Ct. App. 1986).




145. Id. at 250. In so holding, the court relied on California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-15 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that police observation from an airplane in
public airspace of a fenced-off area was not a search.
146. The actual stall design in Limberhand is not spelled out in the opinion, though it
would surprise the author if the stall had extended from floor to ceiling or there were no
spaces between the doors. However, that court did find that a four-inch hole cut out of the
partition did not diminish Mr. Limberhand's reasonable expectation of privacy. 788 P.2d
at 861.
The actual stall design in Kroehler was not spelled out in the opinion. However, the
court did note that it did not matter whether the stalls had doors or not, as it was the
nature of the activity associated with the stalls, and not the design, which guaranteed a
reasonable expectation of privacy for users. See also supra note 71.
it is reasonable to expect that people will not climb over or under
partitions, or look through the small open spaces into a stall. In addi-
tion, the general expectation of privacy generated from the location of
a stall within a public restroom enhances the overall sense of privacy.
In People v. Kalchik,147 Mr. Kalchik performed fellatio and was
then masturbated by another man.148 Both events occurred under a
partition separating two stalls in a public restroom. 49 The police ob-
served Mr. Kalchik's conduct through a video camera placed in the
ceiling above the stalls.' 50 While the court found that it was reason-
able for Mr. Kalchik to expect privacy from surreptitious videotaping
from above,' 5 1 the court concluded that it was not reasonable for Mr.
Kalchik to expect privacy from view under the partition.15
Most stalls do not extend to the ground, and are open at the bot-
tom approximately eight to twenty-four inches. 53 To the extent that
this area is within the viewing range of patrons of the restroom, a per-
son in a stall may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from
people within the restroom. However, the stall is within a public rest-
room. As such, a person in such a stall should be entitled to a reason-
able expectation of privacy from all people except restroom patrons.
In addition, the location of a stall may add to the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy from view from under the stall. Aside from the
outermost stall, most patrons will not be able to see into the stalls
from a standing position, and most patrons will probably not bend
down and position themselves to see into this area. If a police officer,
who was physically present in the restroom as a patron, were to posi-
tion herself or himself in a position where the area was within viewing
range, then this may not be a search. But police use of video cameras
to look into the open area under the stalls of a public restroom vio-
lates a person's reasonable expectation of privacy because it intrudes
into an area protected visual intrusion by two sets of enclosures.
V. Conclusion
That some men choose to engage in sexual activities in public
147. 407 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
148. Id. at 629.
149. Id.
150. Id. The video camera was installed pursuant to a search warrant which the court
held was invalid. Id. at 631.
151. Kalchik, 407 N.W.2d at 631.
152. Id
153. See, e.g., People v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (eight to
twelve inches); United States v. Billings, 858 F.2d 617, 617 (10th Cir. 1988) (twelve inches):
Kalchik, 407 N.W.2d at 630 (fourteen inches); Young, 849 P.2d at 338 (twenty-four inches).
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restrooms is not disputed by this Note.154 What this Note demon-
strates is that when these men do have sex in public restrooms, police
routinely ignore the Fourth Amendment in their quest to arrest. It is
useful to ask whether the police are as vigorous in pursuing straight
people for having sex in public. Similarly, would the prosecutors pur-
sue the cases with the same vigor and would the judges apply the law
in an equally vigorous fashion? 155
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, this Note argues that it
is reasonable for a person to expect privacy from surreptitious surveil-
lance in al areas of a public restroom. In addition, a person should be
able to expect an even greater degree of privacy in the more private
areas of a public restroom, such as a stall. This means that gay men
having sex in a public restroom are entitled to the same expectation of
privacy as all other patrons. The courts which have addressed this
154. Straight and lesbian couples must occasionally have sex in public as well. Deborah
Pellowe, a resident of Adrian, Michigan, commented on the harsh sentences facing men
caught engaging in consensual gay sex in the woods in Adrian: "Who of us has not had
sexual relations, in college or with a date in high school, out on a golf course or in a field or
some place that's been considered public property?" Bruni, supra note 119. This Note
does not advocate the decriminalization of public sex, whether gay or straight. For a dis-
cussion of the merits of decriminalizing public sex, see generally PAT CALIFIA, PUBLIC SEX:
THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX (1994). However, this Note seeks to point out the possi-
ble inconsistency in the investigation and prosecution between gay public sex and straight
public sex. The Note also seeks to raise the question of whether the courts, when hearing
cases regarding straight sex in public, would raise the same policy issues that the courts
raise in cases involving gay sex in public. See supra Section IVA.
155. These questions were answered in one small town in Michigan. In Adrian, Michi-
gan, men who wanted to have anonymous sex with other men went to a large sycamore
tree located in the woods of a public park, Bruni, supra note 119. The police conducted
clandestine surveillance of the woods surrounding the tree over a period of two months.
IL They observed seventeen men engage in consensual sex, and these seventeen men were
later arrested and prosecuted. Id. Many of these men had kept their sexual orientation
hidden, fearing public hostility towards open homosexuality, and many were married to
women. Id. For these men, anonymous sex may have been viewed as the only acceptable
way to have sex and keep their sexual orientation a secret. Following arrest, the local
newspaper printed their names, and as a result some lost their jobs and others had their
homes vandalized. Nat Hentoff, Sex in the Park, WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 1991, at A-17.
All seventeen men were convicted and received sentences ranging from fifteen days to
one year in jail. ld. Many local citizens questioned the fairness of the prosecutions.
Deborah Pellowe, a local resident, was quoted asking "are these people going to jail be-
cause of what they got caught doing, or because they have a different life-style?" Bruni,
supra note 119. Don Dalton, another local resident, said "I would say they shouldn't do it
in a park.... But I would say they went after them because it was guys going in there with
guys. A man and a woman aren't going to get six months in jail." Id.
One of the judges who heard the cases responded that he would prosecute gays and
straights alike. Hentoff, supra. Yet when this same judge was actually confronted with a
case of straight sex in a parking lot of a bar, the judge ruled, as a matter of law, that the act
did not "offend the common sense of decency in the community." Id. In Adrian, the fact
that the men having sex in public were gay motivated the police to conduct surveillance,
the prosecutor to vigorously pursue the cases, and the judges to impose stiff penalties.
issue are divided. In some instances, the courts have justified their
findings on grounds that are clearly impermissible. 156 Courts address-
ing this issue in the future should resolve this issue with a clear appli-
cation of the Katz test and find that a person always has a reasonable
expectation of privacy from surreptitious surveillance in a public
restroom.
156. See supra notes 102-120 and accompanying text.
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